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features of "feminist" are activated. As a result, typical attributes associated with that category are intensified (e.g., Kunda & Thagard, 1996) .
Observe an argument below:
Argument I (Premise) Gazelles have disease X.
(Conclusion) Lions have disease X Standard theories explain that the strength ofthe argument depends on ( | ) how many attributes "gazzeles" and "lions" share, (2) how inclusive the premise is with respect to the conclusion (Heit,2000; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990; Rips, 1975; Sloman, 1993) ,and(3)howrclevantthepremiseisinrelationtotheconclusion(e.g., lions eat gazzelles; therefore, lions and gazelles have the same disease; Heit & Rubinstein, 1993 , Medin, Coley, Storms, & Hayes,2003 Sloman,1994) . In these explanations, the link between language and categorical reasoning is primarily semantic. That is, language influences reasoning because language generates meaning.
Implicit in these explanations is that syntax plays little role in inductive reasoning, and inductive reasoning takes place in an autonomous system of symbol manipulation (Newell & Simon, 1976; Simon, 1990) . This assurnption reflects a long standing view that syntax operates independently from the rest ofcognitive processes (Hauseq Chornsky, & Fintch, 2002; Pinker, 1994 : Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005 . Recent studies in cognitive linguistics and cognitive neuroscience, however, reveal a close connection between language and concepts (Darnasio & Damasio, 1992; Demomet, Thierry, & Cardebat, 2005; Gernsbacher & Kaschak, 2003; Hagoort,2005; Langacker. 1998; Pulvermuller, 1999 ,2004 : Tahny,2003 . For example, research in cognitive linguistics indicates that grammar is a schematic extension of concepts, rather than a collection of abstract rules operating in an independent module (Langacker, 1986 (Langacker, , 1987 (Langacker, , 1998 . Recent brain imaging studies also suggest that the internal representation of lexicons and concepts overlap significantly. For example, reference to action verbs, such as "lick," "pick," or "kick," simultancously activates the sensori-motor areas that support actual actions of licking, picking or kicking, while these areas at the same time provide the basis fbr concept representation (Barsalou, 1999; Damasio, 1989; Demonet, et aI.,2005; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996; Pulverrnuller,2004) .
In this article, I investigate how genericifi; a grammatical property that specifies objects as an abstract wholc-influences inductive reasoning. In so doing, I aim to highlight the link between syntax and reasoning.
Labeling Ef/bct, Generic Noun Phrases and Psychological Essentialism
Compare sentences la 3a with lb 3b. (3b) The French bought wine. These sentences use the same noun labels, dogs, a bird, and the French, but the implications ofthese noun labels are drastically different. Sentences (la) (3a) referto dogs, a bird, and the French with a category as an abstract whole, while ( lb)-(3b) treat the same nouns, dogs, a bird and the French as specific instances of the categories. For example, while ( I a) describes the general characteristic of dogs as a kind, ( I b) tells us an episode about particular dogs. Sentences like (la) (3a) are called generic sentences and convey information about a category as a whole, rather than properties associated with parlicular instances in the category (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Prasada,2000) .
Generic noun phrases can influence reasoning processes by prornoting causal justifications. Consider the following examples.
(4) Dogs bark. (5) The Spanish love soccer. t6) Chairs are for sitting. As these examples show, the characteristics expressed in generic noun phrases are central to the categories, and re-assefting catcgory mernbership can create a sense of causal justification (Prasada, 2000) .
(7) Why do Spanish people like soccer so much'/ Bccause they are Spanish.
(8) Why did he lic'? Bccausc he is a luw.ver. Sentence (7) irnplies that the reason tbr Spanish people's penchant for soccer originates fiorn the essence of "Spanishncss." Scntcnce (8) lbrces us to think that lawyers are in essence liars. In this rnanner, categorical labeling, when stated in a gencric noun phrase, encourage causal rcasoning and helps integrate diverse features. In the next experiment. I show that this inlluence ol'categorical labeling occurs separatcly fiorn thc spccilic rneaning ol'a sentence.
The lbllowing examples hclp illustratc thc dcsign of'the experiment (see Gehnan & Heyman, 1999; Walton & Banaji, 2004; Yarnauchi, 2005 ; lor a similar procedure).
(9) "KINATE" is a diet fbod.
(10) Many people who are dieting eat "KINATE" to reduce their weight.
( I I ) "KINATE" is the diet fbod that Susan cats every morning. The three sentences characterizc an unknown itenr, "KlNATE,," in different manners. (9) is a typical gcncric scntence. This sentence links "KINATE" to a category as an abstractwhole. (10)ref-ersto"KlNATE"intermsofageneral episodeassociatedwiththe item. The idea of "KINATE is a diet lbod" can be inf'erred directly frorn (10), but no explicit ref'erence to a category is made in this sentcncc. Sentence (ll) employs a category inclusion statclncnt in a sirnilar manner described in (9), but this is not a ge'neric sentence. "KINATE" is rnodilied with a deflnite article "the" along with an adjective clause. "KINATE" in (ll) refers to a specific itc'm, not a category of "KINATE" as a whole (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995) . Now consider the cstimation of an unlikely feature "KINATE sells well in mid-size cities"-with respect to these three types of premises (9) (ll) ( Table l) . Previous studies showed that categorical labcling such as in (9) bolsters the estimation of highly likely attributes (e.g., "KINATE contains no fat." see Gelman & Heyrnan, 1999; Walton & B. KINATE sclls well in rlid-sizc cities.
C'. Many pct4rle rvho are dictins eat "KINATE" tcr rcduce thcir ri'eight.
Many people who are dieting eat "KlNATE" to reduce their rveight. lt is rich in protcin but has no fat.
A. People who like KINATE love baseball.
B. KINATE sclls wcll in mid-sizc cities.
C. "KlNATE" is a diet lbod.
"KINATE" is the diet lbod that Susan eats cvery morning. lt is rich in protein but has no l-at.
A. People who likc KINATE love bascball.
B. KINATE sells wcll in mid-size cities.
(i. Many peoplc rvho arc dieting eat "KINATE" to reducc their wr'ight.
Attribute Questions
Probc Quc-stoins
Note. This table shows samplc stimuli givcn in tlrc threc conditions, catcgorical, dcscriptivc. and non-gencric conditions. Participants read rtont statements, and cvaluated thc likelihood ol'attributes given in tllc attribute ctucstions with a I l(X) scalc. Bana1i,2004; Yarnauchi,2005) . Thc rririn explanation suggestcd forthis "labeling cflbct" is that catcgorical statcrnents activate thc underlying "content" of the catsgory. That is, given "KINATE is a diet lbod," thc representation of "diet fbod" is activated (e.g., a listof l'eaturcs and see Kunda & Thagard, 1996) , and the dorninant attribute attached to that reprcscntal i()n is cnltarrccd. Howcver, this explanation is inapplicable to the cstirnation of attributcs that have Dothing to do rvith thc category (c.g., "KINATE sells wcll in rnid-sizc cities"). This target attribute has no obvious connection with the category dict fbod. Thus, ilthe cstimation fbr the urtrelatcd attribute is systernatically enhanced in (9) as comparcd to (10) and (ll), it could be argued that somc generic propcrties underlying oategorical labels inf'luence a rcasoning proccss (c.g., causal justilication) separately liorn thc nonlinal representation of thc category such as prototypes, cxenrplars, or a list ofI'eaturcs contained in the category, Thc current exDerimcnt testcd this idea.
Participants werc -ll7 undcrgraduate students rccrurtcd liorl a large mid-wcstcrn univcrsity in the UnitedStates.'fheyparticipaledinthisexperirncntlbrcoursecrcdit. Thcyu'ererandomlyassigncdtooneof thrce conditions a calcgorical condition (A-104), a dcscriptivc condition (N-ll0), and a non-generic condirion(N-l0j). 6.51
Notc. Thc nunrbcrs rcpresent mcans ol'cstirnation scorcs collcctcd liorn thc data sct, in which thc corrcsponding scorcs lbr probe questions wcrc I 00.
lVul e riu l.: Thc nratcrials wcre l5 descriptiorrs ol'arbitrary itcrls. which wcrc spccilicrl by a cornbination ol thrcc consonant-vo\r'cl pairs (c.g., "KINA'1'tr"). Ilach item is associatcd with onc ol' l-5 catcgorics that roprcscntcd objects, activitics, anrl locations (scc Appcndix and Tablc 2). Typical catcgorical induction studics crnploy biological catcgories such as thc nanrcs ol'animals. I sclcctcd thcso divcrse catcgorics (c.g., ad hoc and script categories and sce Barsalou, l98l: Ross & Murphy, I999) in order to rnaintain thc ccological validitr-and gencrality ol' this experirnent. frtrrl thcsc l5 categorics. thrcc typcs ol'dcscriptrons wcrc crcatcd. In thc catcgorical conditirrn, an tunknown itcnr (e.g., "KINATH") was characterized gcncrically with crtcgorical statcrncnls. In thc dcscriptivc condition, thc samc itcrtt was charactcrizcd dcscriptrvely withoLrt catcgory labels. In thc nongeneric condition, an unknown item was charactcrized with a catcgory inclusion statemcnt, but it was also rnodilied by a dclinitc articlc "the" and an adjcctivc clausc lTable I ).
Lach itcnr statcmcnt accompanicd two attributc qucstions and one probe qucstion, which was showrr last (Tahle I). The lu'o attribute questions wcrc not dircctly lc-lated to the catcgory. For examplc, givcn ir dcscription abcrut a dict lbod. the two attributc qucstions, "Peoplc who likc KINATE love baseball" and "KINATE sells well in mid-size cities" can hardly bc part ol'the content ol "dict f<xrd." The probe cluestions were designed to measure the compatibility ol'the categorical statcments and thc descriptivc statements. For cxample, the probe questions in the categorical condition were the descriptivc statements used in the descriptivc condition. The probc qur'stions usecl in the dc-scriptivc condition were the categorical statcments employed in the catcgorical condition. The probe questions given in the non-generic conditicln were the descriptive statements used in the descriptive condition (Table l) . In this manner. these probe questions measured the extent to which participants endorse categorical statements given descriptive statements, and vice versa. The cstimation scores obtained tiom each probe question were used to balance the rnt'erential value ol'thc categorical statements and the descriptive statcments (see the Results section for details).
Procedure
The task ol'thc participants was to cstirnate the likelihood of attributes given stimulus statements with a 0-100 scale.r Each stirnulus u'as shou'n on a computer screcn and the order ul-presenting the stimuli was detcrnrinetl randonrll for each panicipant.
De.sign
The crpcrinrcnl hacl one lactor with three benveen-subjccts levcls (labeling condition-categorical, dcscnptive, and non-generic). The scores obtained liom two attributc qucstions were cornbined and analyzed together.
RESUI,.TS
To elirrrinate outliers, all estinration scores that deviated 2 standard deviation units liom the mean of each cxperirnental condition were removed fionr the data analysis. This procedure resulted in 4650 data points (91 .8% of the original data points). which were taken fiorn 3 l0 participants.
To ensure that the calegorioal statcrnents and the descriptive statements were equivalent in their truth values, the data were analyzed fbr the participants who rnade a score of 100 to each probe question.
-fhis procedure assures that atl ofthc descriptive statcments wcre endorscd with a score of 100 in thc categorical and non-generic conditions, and all ol'the categorical staternents werc endorsed with a score o1'100 in the descriptive condition (categorical conditiorl, ,V: 89, descriptive condition, N : 98, and non-generic condition, N: tll).r Thus. this data analysis compared participants'attribute estinrations when categorical statcmcnts and descriptive statements werc perceived to be literally cornpatible. To test the generality ol'the results. a minimum value of quasi Frulio (nrin-F\ was also calculated fiorn a sub.ject-based F-value and an item-based F-value 'ln a standard "cirtegory-bascd induction" task, participants cvalr:atc thc strcngth ofa conclusion (e.g.,
Lions have discasc X) given a prcmise (c.g., Cats havc drscasc X). whcre thc trvo itcms (lions and cats) have thc same attribute (c.g., discasc X). This cxperirnent ernployed another induction task. in which the same itenr (e.g., Prcrnise: Linda has attributc X)has dilicrcnt attri[rutes (e.g., ('onclusion: Linda has attribute Y), This typc ol'tasks arc oficn crnlrlo_yt'd in inductivc rc'asoning and impression lbrrnation studies (e.g., Tversky & Kahncrnan. 1983; Kashirna, Woolcock, & Kashima, 1000) . Thc two types of tasks are analogous in the scnse that both investigate thc' rclationship bctwcen catcgorical intirrmation and inductive inf'erences. The lbrmer involves the cstinration ol'thc sarre attribute being projected to dill'ercnt itcms. while the Iater involves the cstimation ofdillcrent attributes being projected to thc same iteln. r The reported results werc bascd on individual pa(icipants who had a probc score ol' I 00 in at least I trial An additional analysis was conducted with the participunts rvhose probe scorcs rvcre I00 in at least 5 triah, Thc results liom this additional analysis wc're nearly identical to those reported in thc Result section. I also conductcd extra analyses with threo dil]'erent selection criteria-1 l) without any data selection restriction, (2) with thc seloction criterion ot'a probe scorc o1'90 or above; (3) with the selection criterion ol-a probe scoreof 80 or above. ln ail cases, thc ovcrall results ol'these additional arral_vscs rvere nearly rdentical to those dcscribed in thc Result section.
after following the suggestion by Clark (1973) . This r.neasure examines whether or not the eff'ect obtained from the three conditions can be seneralized to different items and different participants simultaneously. Overall. estimation scores obtained in the three conditions differed signiticantly; F(2, 267)-7.44, lvISE:260.3,p<.01,min-F'(2,235):6.36,M9E-5l.l,p <.01 (Table2). Planned f-tests revealed that the average estimation score in the categorical condition was lrigher than that in the non-generic condition; t(177) : 3.81, p < .001, d : 0.59: min-F'(|, 163):12.1 , lttsE:86.8, p <.01. The estimation score observed in the categorical condition was also higher than that in the descriptive conditiont (185):2.79, p < .05, d:0.41;ntin-F'(| ,162):6.3, 1t45E:40.3.p<.05.Theperformanceinthedescriptive condition were not statistically diflbrent from that in the non-generic condition; (168):0.98, p:.33, d:0.14:' min-F'(|, 177)<1.0. This result suggests that participants in tlre categorical condition were t-armore likely to endorse unlikely attributes as compared to participants in the descriptive condition and in the non-generic condition even though they fully endorse conesponding descriptive statements and categorical staten]ents perfectly.
There were different numbers of words in the item statements used in the three conditions (categorical condition, M:16.41 , descriptive condition, M:19.4'7, nongeneric condition. M:22.07). l'lris surface disparity might have contributed to the observed differences between the three conditions. To rule out this explanation, itembased ANCOVAs (analysis of covariance) were perlbrmed by treating the number of words in individual stimuli as covariate. This analysis shows that thc rnean estimation score fiom the category condition was higher than those fiom the other two conditions; F(2. 4l) -4.48, MSE -58.70, p < .01; categorical condition vs. descriptive condition; F(l , 21): 4.40. MSE: 66.04. p < .05; categorical condition vs. non-generic condition; F(|.21): 6.64, MSE : 58.94, p < .05. The difl-ere nce between the descriptive condition and the non-gcneric condition was not significant; F(| ,21): I .3 l, MSE : 52.60, p : .26. Clearly, categorical statements, when stated in generic sentences, elevate the estimation of unlikely f'eatures.
Syntax or meaning'! One possible interpretation of thesc results is that the three types of statements (i.c., categorical, descriptive, and non-generic statements) were fundarnentally diflerent in their meonings. Thus, the results can be explained by semantic intbrmation associated with individual sentences, rather than syntactic propcrties attached to generic noun phrases per se. This asserlion, however, merely begs another important question-how do thesc sentences convey diflbrent nreanings to begin with/ In the present experiment, categorical statements and descriptive staternents were int-erentially compatible in the sense that one type of staternents can be readily inferred from the other. This rneans that the diff'erent neuning,s conveyed in the three types of sentences did not corne fiom the nominal representation of a category (e.g., a list of f-eatures and/or exernplars). Furthermore, the targct attributes that parlicipants estimated had no obvious connections with corresponding categories.r Thus, on top of specific meaning conveyed in each sentence, sorne intrinsic property pertinent to category labels should have influenced the reasoning process.
Drscussrol
Previous research has shown that labeling unknown objects with concrete nouns intensifies the interpretation of the attributes associated with the category (Davidoff, 200 I ; Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Walton & Banaji,2004; Yarnauchi, Kohn, & Yu,2007; Yanrauchi & Markman, 2000a , 2000b . The results from this experirnent suggest that part of this phenornenon arises from syntactic properties attached to generic noun labels. Generic sentences describe characteristics of a group as a whole (e.g., "The French loves wing"). In so doing, they lead us to think that the attribute described in a sentence is essential to the category (Gelman,2003; Medin & Ortony, 1989) . This intuitive belief attached to generic sentences could help interpret other attributes. For example, when an unknown object is stated in a generic sentence ("'KINATE'is a diet food"), a notion of essential properties is cvoked (e.g.,"'KINATE' can help reduce body weight), which in tr"rrn leads us to interpret other unrelated attributes ("'KINATE' sells well in mid-size cities) in relation to the essential property (e.g.. there should be rnany overweight people in mid-size cities; therefore, "KINATE" should scll well in rrrid-size cities). I argue that the rcsults observed in the present study rellect the fundamental link between generic noun phrases, category labels, and inttritive theorie.y.
The present findings extend the developmental studies that dernonstrated a structural relationship betwcen children's induction and gramrnatical properties (Brown, l9-57; Gelman, Hollander, Star, & Heynran,200(); Markman & Hutchinson, 1984; Waxrnan & Booth,200 l) . The present results indicate that the labeling efl'ect reported in children (e.g., Gelman & Heyrrlan, 1999) is not transient, and observable well beyond the developmcntal process specific to language acquisition.
How are gencric noun phrases, category labels, and intuilive !heorics integrated? I speculate that this complcx relationship was established in the course of the development o1-language. Although anthropologists, linguists, and evolutionary psychologists disagree how language evolved, there is a general consensus that the ability to use syrnbols tbr communication preceded the dcveloprnent o1' human language (Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Deacon, 1991) . Pinker (2003) suggests that language developed partly due to the need to capture causal relationships in an environment. English syntax, fbr cxarnple, transmits causal inforrnation by means of word order (e.9., a dog bites a man vs. a man bites a dog) (Pinker, 1994 (Pinker, ,2003 . Analogously, generic noun phrases and category labels help transmit causal infbmation by incorporaling inluitive thenries (see Ahn, I998;  for the relationship between categories and causal inlbrmation). For exarnple, a generic cxpression such as "lions are predators" not only extends our knowledge about a particular lion to lions in general, but also helps understand how other animals are causally related 'Y;'.".1" (200ir .n.prr.'A ..ti,r',.rinni rnarlc to thc'sc uirlikely lcaturcs wirh likcly lcatrrres. for examplc, givcn a categorical statemont, "'KINATE' is a dict lbod," (he estimations lbr unlikcll, f'eatures, such as "'KINATE'sclls well in mid-size cities," wcre comparcd to thosc rnade to likely teatures, such as "'KINATE'helps lower onc's cholestcrol level." Thrs study showcd that the estirnation scores obtained in thesc unlikely attributes were indced far belorv as compared to likeli, attributes. See Experiment 2 in Yarnauchi (2005) fbr details.
-'-(e.g., Lions prey on gazelles; therefbre gazelles are weak but run fast, and that is the reason why gazelles live together to protect thenrselves from lions). In this manner, generic sentences help e.xtract causal relationships in an environment. Because of this causal value, infuitive belief; such as psychological essentialism rnight have been integrated into generic noun phrases and category labels. Implications: Calegorical labeling and inductive reasoning. A main assunrption in cognitive science has been that an autonomous system of symbol rnanipulation mediates inductive reasoning (Newell & Simon, 1976; Simon, 1990) . Followin-e this assumption, research on categorical reasoning has focused on uncovering computational algorithms of reasoning (e.g., Heit,2000; Sloman, 1993) . rvhile payirrg little attention to the role of language. ln this regard. standard theories of inductive reasoning explain an inductive process by means of similarity, representativeness, availability, or background knowledge associated with prernises and conclusions (see Murphy. 2002 for review) . These explanations can be summarized under the same umbrella of associative networks, in which external knowledge and contexts provide additional associative strength to an existin-q network (Kunda & Thagard. 1996; Redher & Murphy,2003l Rogers & McClelland, 2004 Rumelhart, 1990; Rumelhart & Todd, 1993; Sloman, 1993) . Given the Iact that granrrnatical inlbrmation allbcts inductive behavior of adults, it is unlikely that these associative nctworks can account for labeling biases fllly unless the network cmploys some mechanism ol'representing gramrnatical infbrmation such as genericity. Puture studies have to e"'aluate this asscrtion.
In conclusion, by demonstrating a connection between the labcling cll-ect and gcneric sentenccs, this study suggests that thcre is a signilicant link betwecn a cognitive systern that creales:t conccpt and a linguistic system that organizes language. This study further suggcsts that the study ofcognitivc systcms can be aided vastly by thc study of languagc and vice vcrsa.
